

Message Text

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TO AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO PRIORITY
INFO HORN OF AFRICA COLLECTIVE
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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:SO, US, ET, DJ, KE, SU, CU, MASS, PBOR

SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE'S MEETING WITH SOMALI
AMBASSADOR ADDOU, APRIL 10

1. THE MEETING WAS AT AMBASSADOR ADDOU'S REQUEST. MR.
MOOSE BEGAN BY SAYING HE HAD TOLD PRESIDENT CARTER OF HIS
HIGH REGARD FOR PRESIDENT SIAD WHOSE QUALITY AS A LEADER
HE HAD COME TO APPRECIATE DURING HIS MEETINGS IN MOGADISCIO.
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WAS CONCERNED BY THE REPORTS
OF THE ATTEMPTED COUP IN SOMALIA ON APRIL 9 AND WE WERE
RELIEVED TO KNOW THAT PRESIDENT SIAD'S POSITION REMAINED
FIRM.

2. ADDOU REPLIED THAT THE COUP ATTEMPT HAD BEEN MOUNTED
BY A NUMBER OF JUNIOR OFFICERS TRAINED IN MOSCOW WITH THE
SUPPORT OF SOME CIVILIANS. THE GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN
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PREPARED, BUT COULD NOT ARREST THE PARTICIPANTS UNTIL THEY
MOVED. THESE PEOPLE HAD EARLIER ATTEMPTED TO SPEAK OUT
TO COUNTER SOME OF THE ANTI-SOVIET STATEMENTS MADE BY THE
SOMALIA GOVERNMENT. TO THWART THEIR OPPOSITION, PRESIDENT
SIAD HAD INSISTED THAT ALL SOMALI REVOLUTIONARY SOCIALIST
PARTY STATEMENTS BE CLEARED BY VICE PRESIDENT ABOKOR AND
THAT ALL GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS BE CLEARED BY PRESIDENT

SIAD OR VICE PRESIDENT KULMIYE. SUCH CONTROL WAS IMPORTANT BECAUSE, WHILE IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR ANYONE TO DEFEND THE SOVIET UNION IN SOMALIA, IT WAS NOT SO DIFFICULT TO ATTACK THE UNITED STATES AS UNRELIABLE AND GRADUALLY BRING ABOUT A CHANGE OF OPINION WHICH WOULD OBJECTIVELY FAVOR THE SOVIETS. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES PRESIDENT SIAD WAS CONCERNED THAT THE SOVIET UNION, WITH THE HELP OF ETHIOPIA AND CUBA, WOULD CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE CONDUCIVE TO UNCERTAINTY AND UPHEAVAL IN SOMALIA. HE THEREFORE HOPED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT DELAY FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSED MILITARY RELATIONSHIP. A PROMPT RESPONSE MIGHT BE VITAL TO SIAD'S REGIME.

3. MR. MOOSE SAID THAT WE HOPED TO MOVE RAPIDLY IN THE DIRECTION DISCUSSED WITH PRESIDENT SIAD IN MOGADISCIO. WE WOULD SHORTLY ASK AMBASSADOR LOUGHRAN TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT SIAD TO REMOVE ANY AMBIGUITY IN PRESIDENT SIAD'S ASSURANCES THAT THE SOMALI GOVERNMENT WOULD USE US SUPPLIED DEFENSE ARTICLES ONLY FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES AND WOULD NOT USE FORCE AGAINST HER NEIGHBORS. WHILE WE UNDERSTOOD THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SOMALI REVOLUTIONARY SOCIALIST PARTY IN WHOSE NAME THE ASSURANCES HAD BEEN GIVEN, WE NEEDED AN ACCEPTANCE OF THESE UNDERTAKINGS, NOT QUALIFIED BY THE WORDS "IN CONFIDENTIAL

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PRINCIPLE" AND ON BEHALF OF THE SOMALI GOVERNMENT ITSELF. ONCE THIS POINT WAS CLARIFIED, WE COULD DISCUSS WHAT MILITARY ITEMS THE UNITED STATES MIGHT PROVIDE.

4. MR. MOOSE SAID HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE A SMALL TEAM LOOK AT THE FULL RANGE OF SOMALI NEEDS, EVEN THOUGH PRESIDENT SIAD HAD EXPRESSED SOME DOUBT THAT SUCH A TEAM WOULD SERVE A USEFUL PURPOSE. PRESIDENT SIAD HAD ALSO BEEN RELUCTANT TO HAVE A MILITARY ATTACHE. WE WERE NOT PRESSING FOR ONE NOW, BUT WE BELIEVED WE HAD A NEED FOR SOME PROFESSIONAL VIEW OF THE SOMALI DEFENSE POSITION. AMBASSADOR ADDOU SAID HE BELIEVED THAT A MILITARY ATTACHE BOTH HERE AND IN MOGADISCIO WAS HIGHLY NECESSARY. HE ALSO BELIEVED THAT AN EVALUATION MISSION WOULD BE USEFUL AND HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO CONVINCE PRESIDENT SIAD TO GO ALONG WITH SUCH AN EFFORT. CONCERNING THE REASSURANCES THAT WE SOUGHT, AMBASSADOR ADDOU BELIEVED THAT SINCE THE POLITBURO OF THE PARTY IN EFFECT COMPRISED THE TOP POLICY MAKERS OF THE GOVERNMENT, THERE WOULD NO DIFFICULTY IN GETTING GOVERNMENTAL

APPROVAL FOR THE ASSURANCES WE SOUGHT. MOOSE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THIS VIEW SAYING THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO CLEAR UP THE QUESTION, OTHERWISE IT MIGHT BE SEIZED UPON AS A SIGN OF SOMALIA'S INTENTION TO TAKE THE MILITARY ROAD AGAIN. MOOSE HIMSELF HAD TAKEN THE POSITION WHENEVER ASKED THAT THE REASON THE UNITED STATES HAD NOT YET GONE AHEAD WITH A MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WAS NOT LACK OF AGREEMENT WITH THE SOMALI GOVERNMENT, BUT TO GIVE BOTH SIDES TIME TO REFLECT ON THE CONVERSATIONS IN MOGADISCIO. ADDOU INSISTED THAT PRESIDENT SIAD WAS READY AND WAITING FOR CONFIRMATION OF WASHINGTON'S POSITION. SIAD WAS ONE HUNDRED PERCENT COMMITTED TO CLOSE TIES WITH THE UNITED STATES, BUT TIME
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WAS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE.

5. TURNING TO SOMALIA'S RELATIONS WITHIN THE HORN AREA, ADDOU OPINED THAT THE WAR IN THE OGADEN MIGHT BE A BLESSING IN DISGUISE, HAVING PROVIDED THE WORLD WITH AN OPPORTUNITY TO SEE THE TRUE NATURE OF SOVIET DESIGNS IN THE REGION. ADDOU HIMSELF BELIEVED THAT A SUCCESS FOR THE ERITREAN LIBERATION GROUPS WAS VERY MUCH TO BE DESIRED. IT WOULD BE A GREAT BLOW TO THE SOVIET UNION; ONCE THE SOVIETS WERE OUT OF THE HORN, THERE WOULD BE LITTLE DIFFICULTY IN ESTABLISHING GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN SOMALIA AND ETHIOPIA. MEANWHILE, THE KENYANS APPEARED TO BE PLAYING INTO THE HANDS OF THE SOVIETS. ADDOU HOPED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO GET THE SUDAN, SOMALIA, AND KENYA TO COOPERATE TOGETHER. UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT LONG MAINTAIN ITS POSITION. MOOSE REPLIED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT SOMALIA AND KENYA HAVE BETTER RELATIONS. PRESIDENT SIAD HAD RECOUNTED THE EFFORTS HE HAD MADE TO DEAL WITH THE SOMALIA/ KENYAN RELATIONSHIP, AND MOOSE WAS SOMEWHAT DISAPPOINTED TO BE TOLD THAT SIAD FELT HE WAS UNABLE TO DO ANYTHING FURTHER. THE UNITED STATES HAD AN INTEREST IN SEEING THAT BOTH COUNTRIES MAINTAINED GOOD RELATIONS AND IT MIGHT BE THAT AN ADDITIONAL GESTURE FROM THE SOMALI SIDE WOULD BE APPROPRIATE. WE HAD ALSO SPOKEN TO THE KENYANS ABOUT THE DANGER OF THE SOVIET AND CUBAN PRESENCE IN THE AREA AND HAD URGED THEM TO SHOW MORE UNDERSTANDING OF THE SOMALI POSITION. THEREFORE THE SOMALIS OUGHT NOT TO THINK THAT WE WERE MAKING THESE POINTS ONLY IN MOGADISCIO AND NOT IN NAIROBI. WE WERE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT SOMALIA/DJIBOUTI RELATIONS AND THE DANGER OF SOMALI POLITICAL MOVES IN DJIBOUTI. PRESIDENT SIAD COULD PLAY THE ROLE OF A STATESMAN IN
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THE REGION IF HE WOULD GO THE EXTRA MILE TO REDUCE THE

LEVEL OF TENSION WITH HIS NEIGHBORS. SO LONG AS THE KENYANS WERE CONCERNED ABOUT SOMALIA, IT UNDERCUT THE US ABILITY TO BE OF ASSISTANCE, AND IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE KENYANS NOT FEEL REQUIRED, FOR GOOD REASON OR ILL, TO MOVE TOWARD THE SOVIETS. MR. MOOSE HAD SUGGESTED THAT PRESIDENT SIAD TAKE A LOOK AT THE ARUSHA MEMORANDUM (SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENT OF KENYA AND THE SOMALI PRIME MINISTER IN ARUSHA TANZANIA ON OCTOBER 28, 1967) TO SEE IF THAT SORT OF HARMONIOUS RELATIONSHIP COULD NOT BE RESTORED. ADDOU SAID HE HAD NO DOUBT THAT SIAD BARRE WOULD BE MUCH MORE FORTHCOMING TOWARD KENYA ONCE HE HAD THE SECURITY OF US MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

7. ADDOU SAID THAT PRESIDENT SIAD WOULD BE GOING TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON THE 15TH OF APRIL. SOMALI MINISTER OF INFORMATION HAD BROUGHT BACK A CHINESE EXPRESSION OF WILLINGNESS TO TAKE OVER ECONOMIC PROJECTS ABANDONED BY THE SOVIETS, AND SIAD WOULD ATTEMPT TO TAKE THEM UP ON THE OFFER. ADDOU DID NOT BELIEVE THAT MILITARY QUESTIONS WOULD BE DISCUSSED.

8. FYI: WITH REFERENCE TO MOOSE'S STATEMENT THAT MILITARY SURVEY TEAM WOULD LOOK AT "FULL RANGE OF SOMALI NEEDS", THIS IS STILL A MATTER OF DISCUSSION HERE AND SHOULD NOT BE REPEATED BY YOU AT THIS TIME. CLEARED LANGUAGE ON THIS SUBJECT WILL BE CONTAINED IN YOUR INSTRUCTIONS SEEKING CLARIFICATION OF SIAD'S ASSURANCES WHICH WE HOPE TO SEND YOU THIS WEEK. VANCE

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